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Abstract: The rapid rise of federated enterprises entails a new way of trust management 
by the fact that an enterprise can account for partial trust of its affiliating 
organizations. On the other hand, password has historically been used as a 
main means for user authentication because of operational simplicity. We are 
thus motivated to explore the use of short password for user authentication and 
key exchange in the context of federated enterprises. Exploiting the special 
structure of a federated enterprise, our proposed new architecture comprises an 
external server managed by each affiliating organization and a central server 
managed by the enterprise headquarter. We are concerned with the 
development of an efficient authentication and key exchange protocol using 
password, built over the new architecture. The architecture together with the 
protocol well addresses off-line dictionary attacks initiated at the server side, a 
problem rarely considered in prior effort. 
Key words: federated enterprise; password authentication; dictionary attack; key exchange; 
public key cryptosystem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Driven by the promise of cost saving, expansion of market share and 
quality improvement of service provision through consolidation and 
cooperation, industry has seen a rapid rise of federated enterprises. 
Specifically, a federated enterprise consolidates under one corporate 
umbrella multiple divisions, branches and affiliations serving different 
aspects of business continuum and senice coverage. For example, in the 
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banlung sector, a central bank has numerous branches distributed across a 
city, a region. Another example is in the healthcare area, where a federated 
hospital integrates many inside and outside units, e.g., clinical laboratories, 
departments, outpatient clinics, managed care organizations, pharmacies and 
so on. In a federated enterprise, each affiliating organization has its own 
business interest, providing service to a distinct group of users. 
Following conventional ways, each affiliating organization has to work 
independently on trust management, maintaining by itself account 
information of its users. However, this may not be optimal in practice. First, 
affiliating organizations may lack sufficient expertise and funds for a secure 
maintenance of user account. This situation deteriorates with the trend that 
organizations are becoming increasingly fond of outsourcing IT management 
to some specialized service providers. In such circumstances, system 
administrators may present themselves as a big threat to system security [I]. 
Second, from the users' perspective, a user apparently prefers assuming the 
higher credit of the entire enterprise rather than that of an individual 
affiliating organization. For these reasons, new paradigm of trust 
management that well takes advantage of the special structure of federated 
enterprises is of interest and urgency. 
On the other hand, human memorable password has historically been 
used as a main means for user authentication, due to operational simplicity. 
In particular, no dedicated device is required for storing password, which is 
deemed of particular importance as users are becoming increasingly roaming 
nowadays. We are thus interested in exploring the use of short passwords for 
user authentication and key exchange in the context of federated enterprises. 
Towards this, we are faced to first address the weaknesses inherent in 
password-enabled systems: because of a limited dictionary space, password 
is susceptible to brute-force dictionary attack, and more precisely off-line 
dictionary attach? [2]. Specifically, in off-line dictionary attack, an attacker 
records the transcript of a successful login between a user and the server, and 
then enumerates and checks every possible password against the transcript, 
until eventually determine a correct password. Tremendous effort has been 
dedicated to resisting off-line dictionary attack in password-enabled 
protocols (e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 101). An assumption common to these 
methods is that the server is completely reliable, so users share with the 
server clear passwords or some easily-derived values of passwords for 
subsequent user authentication. As such, while these protocols are 
sufficiently robust to off-line dictionary attacks by the outside attackers, they 
In contrast to off-line attack is on-line dictionary attack, which turns out to be easily 
thwarted by restricting the number of unsuccessful login attempts made by a user. 
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are not intended to defend against the server, e.g., in the event of penetration 
by outside attackers. 
However, for the reasons discussed earlier (limited expertise and funds, 
outsourcing, etc.), threats posed by the server become clearer in the setting 
of federated enterprises. As a consequence, servers maintained by the 
affiliating organizations of an enterprise are no longer deemed fully trusted. 
Adapting password-enabled systems to federated enterprises has to 
additionally mitigate the concern of unreliable servers, in addition to outside 
attackers. To this end, we propose a new architecture for user authentication 
and key exchange using password, geared to the needs of federated 
enterprises. In its simplest configuration, the architecture consists of an 
external sewer managed by each affiliating organization and a central sewer 
administrated by the enterprise; each server only keeps partial information 
on a user password, such that no single server can recover the password by 
means of off-line dictionary attacks user authentication is accomplished 
together by the two servers. Our attention is given to the development of an 
efficient authentication protocol for the new architecture, rather than formal 
provable security. The proposed architecture together with the protocol 
enjoys several attractive features 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review 
related work. We then present our new architecture and discuss extension in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we propose an efficient user authentication and key 
exchange protocol well attuned to the new architecture, and security of the 
protocol is examined. Finally, Section sec5 concludes the paper. 
RELATED WORK 
Resistance to off-line dictionary attack has long been in the core of 
research on password-enable systems. It is a proven fact that public key 
techniques are absolutely necessary so as to resist off-line dictionary attacks, 
whereas the involvement of public key cryptosystems is not essential [7]. 
Accordingly, two separate lines of research have been seen in the literature: 
combined use of password and public key cryptosystem, and password only 
approach. For the former, asymmetry of capacity between the users and the 
server is considered, so that a user only uses a password while the server has 
a publiclprivate key pair at its disposal. Examples of such public key- 
assisted password authentication include [7, 8, 1 I]. With no surprise, the use 
of public keys entails the deployment of PKI for certification, adding to the 
users the burden of checlung key validity. To eliminate this drawback, 
password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols have been 
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extensively explored (e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 101). The PAKE protocols do not 
involve any public key cryptosystem whatsoever. 
What common to the above methods is the assumption that the server is 
totally trustful, so a user shares a password or some password-derivative 
value with the server. In other words, these methods are by no means 
resilient to the off-line dictionary attack initiated by the server, e.g., in the 
event of break-ins by outside attackers. To address this problem, [I21 first 
proposed the so-called password hardening technique by transforming a 
weak password into a strong one through several servers, thereby eliminating 
a single point of vulnerability. Afterwards, [13] improved this multi-server 
model. Further and more rigorous extensions were due to [I41 and [15], 
where the former built a t-out-of-n threshold PAKE protocol and gave 
formal security proof under the Random Oracle Model [16], and the latter 
presented another two provably secure threshold PAKE protocols under the 
standard model. A limitation of the protocols in [I41 and 1151 is their low 
efficiency, so they may not be practical to resource-constrained users, e.g., 
mobile phones. Moreover, notice that in the above multi-server setting, 
password is still susceptible to a weaker form of a single point of 
vulnerability, in the sense that passwords are eventually reconstructed by a 
dealer at the time of user authentication. 
By contrast, in our architecture no trust exists between the central server 
and the external server, thus a single point of vulnerability is completely 
eliminated. This however adds substantial challenges to the design of the 
underlying authentication protocol. Our basic architecture (one central server 
is involved) is similar to a recent novel two-server model in [17], which was 
to overcome the deficiency of complex and computation extensive protocols 
in [14, 151. The protocol in [I71 assumes that servers use SSL to establish 
secure communication channel with users. Distinctions between our work 
and [I71 include: (a) we achieve mutual (bilateral) authentication as well as 
key exchange, whereas [17] considered merely unilateral authentication of 
the user to the servers, and no key exchange; (b) we develop a different 
protocol for testing the equality of two numbers under our presumed 
adversary model. Without a similar explicitly specified adversary model, the 
protocol in [I71 may cause trouble in case that one of the two servers 
deliberately disrupts the protocol, attempting to gain advantages over the 
other; (c) our architecture is tailored to federated enterprises, whereas the 
model in [17] was suggested for an organization outsoucing a part of its trust 
management to a security service provider; (d) we also suggest extending the 
basic architecture to an architecture including a group of central servers, 
solving the possible bottleneck caused by one single central server. 
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3. A NEW AUTHENTICATION ARCHITECTURE 
FOR FEDERATED ENTERPRISES 
Our basic architecture is shown in Figure 1 : at the server side, an external 
sewer and a central sewer coexist; the external server is the actual one 
providing service to the users, thereby standing front-end; the central server 
is to assist the external server for user authentication, staying transparent to 
the users. A main objective of this architecture is to "harden" a user's short 
password into two long secrets and each is hosted by a server, so that neither 
of the two servers can launch off-line dictionary attacks. As discussed earlier, 
a uniqueness of this architecture is represented by the fact that no trust exists 
between the two servers. This on the one hand totally eliminates a single 
point of vulnerability, while on the other hand makes the design of the 
underlying password-enabled protocol particularly challenging. In particular, 
the two servers together validate user passwords, whereas no extra 
information should be leaked to each other in facilitating off-line dictionary 
attack. 
User 
Figure I. Basic two-server architecture for federated enterprises 
Figure 2 shows the scenario when applying this basic structure to a 
federated enterprise: the headquarter of the enterprise manages the central 
server, and each affiliating organization operates an external server, 
providing service to a group of users of its own. This architecture offers 
several benefits: 
First of all, of particular advantage is that neither the central server nor 
the external servers can compromise user passwords by means of off-line 
dictionary attack. 
Affiliating organizations are relieved from strict trust management to 
some extent, so they can dedicate their limited expertise and resources to 
enhancing service provision to the users. 
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Users are afforded to assume the higher credit of the enterprise, wlde 
engaging business with individual affiliating organizations. 
The enterprise is provided a way to monitor the affiliating organizations, 
deterring them from cheating. 
As the central sever is hidden from the public, the chance for it under 
attacks is substantially minimized, thereby increasing the overall security 
of the architecture. 
Enterprise Headquarter 
----------- 
Affiliating Org. I  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
r I 
- - J  
I Sewer I 
- - - - - - - - 
User 
Figure 2. Typical application scenarios 
3.1 Extension 
In the basic architecture, a single central server is to collaborate with 
numerous external servers in a federated enterprise. It is thus possible that 
the central server becomes a system bottleneck. To mitigate this concern, we 
suggest extending to include several central servers as a group as shown in 
Figure 3. The group of central servers work under a 2-out-of-n threshold 
secret sharing scheme (e.g., ['8]), so that each holds a share of the secret that 
would be otherwise kept by a single central server (n is the total number of 
the central servers). When an external server requests for user authentication, 
one of the servers volunteers to manage the reconstruction of the secret 
among the group. This voluntary central server is the only one interacting 
with the requesting external server, thus the external server feels nothing 
different as with a single central server. This extension not only solves the 
potential bottleneck problem, but also addresses the issue of failures or break 
downs of a single central server. 
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Figure 3. Extended architecture including a group of central servers 
4. AN AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE 
PROTOCOL USING PASSWORD 
In this section, we shall detail the authentication and key exchange 
protocol using password, which is geared to the setting of federated 
enterprises. The protocol is built over the basic architecture in Figure 1. 
Extension to the extended architecture in Figure 3 is also discussed. A 
central building block of our protocol is a sub-protocol for testing the 
equality of two numbers. For ease of reference, we start with listing the 
notations that are used in the sequel. 
Table I .  Notations 
P, 4 two large primes such that p = 2q+ 1. 
g a generator of a subgroup of 2,' of order q. 
n a user's password. 
h . )  H . )  cryptographic hash functions which are modelled as random oracle [16]. 
U, ES, CS identity of a user, the external sever and the central server, respectively. 
Ed.) ,  Dd.) encryption and decryption functions (of a semantic secure public key 
cryptosystem) by entity 2 s  public key and private key, respectively. 
4.1 The setting 
Three types of entities are involved in our system, i.e., the users, the 
external servers and the central server. For the purpose of authentication, 
each user U has a short password K ,  and z is transformed into two long 
secrets, each of which is held by the external server ES that U belongs to and 
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the central server CS, respectively. CS stays transparent to the public, and ES 
acts as the relaying party between U and CS. In such a scenario, it is 
reasonable to assume authentic communications between ES and CS. 
Definitely, this assumption can be readily accomplished by the two parties 
sharing a secret, which is used to key a MAC. Considering the close tie 
between the two parties, it is also convenient for them to periodically (e.g., 
once a week) update this secret, e.g., the headquarter (CS) sends a new secret 
to the affiliating organization (ES) by normal mail weekly. CS has an 
authentic key pair that corresponds to a semantically secure public key 
cryptosystem, with the encryption function (resp. decryption function) Ecs(.) 
(resp. Dcs(.)). As discussed earlier, in a federated enterprise CS clearly 
assumes more trust than ES because of sufficient expertise, funds, and the 
fact that CS is not directly exposed to the public. Considering such 
asymmetry in terms of trust upon CS and ES, adversary model in our 
protocol is that CS is semi-honest and ES is malicious, with respect to their 
desire for off-line dictionary attack, and they do not collude. More 
specifically, CS is honest-but-curious ['9], i.e., it follows the protocol, with 
the exception that it may try to derive extra information by analyzing the 
protocol transcript; on the contrary, ES may act arbitrarily for uncovering 
user passwords. 
4.2 High level description 
Central to our protocol is to fight against off-line dictionary attack by the 
servers (Note that outside attackers are clearly no more powerful than the 
external server in this regard). The intuition behind our authentication and 
key exchange protocol is as follows: in an out-of-band registration phase, a 
user U "hardens" his password n into two random long secrets s and n + s, 
and registers them to the external server ES and the central server CS, 
respectively, where s is a random number. In authentication phase, U picks 
another long random number r and sends r and n + r to the two servers, 
respectively. Upon receiving the messages, ES computes a = r - s, and CS 
computes b = (n + r) - (n + s) = r - s. Afterwards, the two servers engage 
into an interactive protocol to test a ?= b. Note that a = b holds if and only 
if user U knows n. Upon the servers validating the user, ES and U negotiate a 
common session key for subsequent data exchanges. Clearly, from s and r 
(resp. n + s and n + r), ES (resp. CS) is unable to gain anything useful on n. 
It is thus of crucial importance to ensure the protocol for testing a ?= b could 
not facilitate the servers for off-line dictionary attack. In what follows, we 
first propose a protocol allowing two parties to test a ?= b, which will be 
invoked by our final authentication and key exchange protocol that follows. 
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4.3 A protocol testing a ?= b 
A protocol for simply testing a ?= b by two parties A (possessing a)  and 
B (possessing b), while without disclosing a and b may be quite 
straightforward. See a simple example: A sends h(a) to B and B sends h(b) to 
A, where h(.) is a hash function as defined in Table 1; each party checks 
h(a) ?= h(b). A variant is that A sends G, = go modp to B and B sends Gb = 
gb mod p to A, where p and g are defined as in Table 1; each party then 
checks G, ?= Gb. Both methods however cannot avert off-line dictionary 
attack by the two parties in our case. Take the first example and A for 
instance, A chooses a random number r and computes a = r - s for himself, 
and simply sends r to B. B will return h(r - s - x) to A. It is easy to see that A 
can enumerate every possible password until find n: such that h(a - x') = h(r 
- s - x). In a same way, the attack applies to the variant example, although in 
normal cases, it is hard to get a (resp. b) given Go (resp. Gb) according to 
discrete logarithm assumption. These examples convey to some extent the 
subtleties in designing a protocol in our case of withstanding off-line 
dictionary attack. 
Let QR, denote the group of quadratic residues modulo p ,  and a hash 
function be defined as h: {O, l}'Pi + QR,, where p, q, h(.) are public 
parameters and as defined in Table 1. Note that in practice h can be achieved 
by squaring a one-way hash function, e.g., SHAI. We outline our proposed 
protocol for testing a ?= b in Figure 4 (all arithmetic operations are 
calculated modulo p). 
Figure 4. A protocol testing a ?= b 
Specifically, A picks kA E R Z, on the fly and computes y ,  = h ( ~ ) ~ "  
mod p. A initiates the protocol by sending yA to B. Upon receiving the 
message, B chooses kB E Zq, in turn compctes yB = h(blk" mod p and 
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k ,  
w, = y, modp, respectively. B then sends y, to A. After receiving y,, A 
k ,  computes w, = y, modp and sends w, to B. With WA, B tests wA ?= WE. 
B then sends WB to A if w, = WB, and a special label otherwise. A then tests 
wg ? = w, if wB is received. 
4.3.1 Security analysis 
In line with the adversary model defined in our final protocol, we assume 
A a malicious adversary while B an honest-but-curious adversary. In addition, 
for the moment we assume A does not replay messages, and the 
communication between A and B is authentic. These assumptions will be 
clear when we come to our final protocol. 
We start by by claiming that upon completion of theprotocol, either (1) A 
and B learn that a = b or (2 )  A and B learn a * b but nothing more on the 
opposite side's secret. 
Clearly in the first case, if w~ = wB holds, A and B learn that a = b. We 
next show if a # b (this may be due to that A cheats by intentionally using a, 
which is different from his original input), both parties learn nothing more. 
Consider A first: intuitively, A gets y ,  = h ( b ) k n  mod p at the end of the 
protocol. It is easy to see that without knowing kB, A is unable to obtain 
anything on b in an information theoretic sense. Next, consider the case of B: 
when the protocol terminates, of relevance to B is ( y, =,h(a)k~ mod p, 
W~ = Y E  k~ mod p). Notice intuitively that (w,, yB = wAk'- mod p, yA, 
h(a)  = v , k ~ - '  mod p) is indistinguishable from (wA, y,, y ~ ,  Z ) under the 
decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [20], where z is random and kAkA-' = 1 
mod q. Therefore B cannot learn anything more on a from executing the 
protocol. 
Our next claim is that f A  aborts the protocol before completion, he is 
unable to gain more advantages over B. To see this, the only place A is 
likely to abort is after receiving yB from B. But as we have discussed, y, does 
not leak anything on b. Our claim thus holds. We stress that as an honest- 
but-curious adversary, B is not interested in deviating from the protocol, e.g., 
deliberately aborting the protocol or sending in the case of w~ = wg. In this 
sense, our protocol achieves "fairness". 
4.4 Authentication and key exchange using password 
We now present an efficient authentication and key exchange protocol 
using password, built over the basic architecture in Figure 1. The earlier 
protocol for testing a ?= b is invoked in this protocol as a building block, 
where ES plays the role of A and CS takes the role of B. In the sequel, we 
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occasionally omit "modulo p" in stating arithmetic operations as long as the 
context is clear. 
System parameters are defined as follows: p and q are as defined in Table 
1, and QR, is the group of quadratic residues modulop. A hash function H(.) 
(e.g., SHAI) is employed. Moreover, g is picked from QR, as g E QRp\ (1 ). 
Clearly, g is of order of q. H(.), p,  q and g are public parameters. 
To enrol as a legitimate user in a service, it is natural that at the 
beginning, a user must authenticate to the service provider and in turn 
establish a password with the organization for subsequent service access. In 
our case, U needs to register to not only the actual service provider ES but 
also the enterprise CS that ES is affiliated to. 
4.4.1 Registration 
Suppose U has already successfully authenticated to ES, e.g., by showing 
his identity card, U picks his password 7c and selects a random number SE 
QR,. U then registers in a secure way s and 7c + s mod p to ES and CS, 
respectively. Here for purely simplicity reasons, we assume (n + s m o d p ) ~  
QR;. Consequently, ES stores the account information (U, s) to its secret 
database, and CS stores (U, + s mod p )  to its secret database. Someone 
may wonder how Uregisters n + s to CS, as CS is supposed hidden from the 
public. This is in fact not a problem in practice: U can contact CS by normal 
mail, etc. Indeed, imagine that a user enrols in a branching bank, it is not 
strange at all that the user still needs to submit a secret to a higher authority 
of the bank so as to activate his account. 
Upon completion of the registration, U can request service from ES, by 
exploiting the protocol in Figure 5 for authentication and establishment of a 
common session key. 
4.4.2 The protocol 
Let us follow the protocol (in Figure 5 )  step by step. To initiate the 
protocol, U picks x as x E Z, and computes e, = gr mod p, which will be 
used for (Diffie-Hellman) key exchange. U also selects r as r E Z,, and 
encrypts ex, 7c + r modp and Tusing CS's authentic public key as eo = Ecs(e,, 
n + r, T), where T is the current timestamp. U then sends in MI the message 
of (U, ex, r, eo, T )  to ES. Upon receipt of the message, E S  first checks 
whether T is within a pre-defined time window: if T expires, ES simply 
In our protocol, we require (n + s mod p )E  QR, Indeed, if (rr + s mod p)P  QR,, then it 
must hold that (p - n -s mod p) E QR,,. 
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returns reject to U and aborts the protocol; otherwise, ES proceeds ahead. ES 
searches his secret database for Us account. If no such an account is found, 
ES returns reject to U and stops the protocol; otherwise, ES fetches the secret 
s and computes a = r - s mod p ;  ES also keeps e, in his live buffer. 
Afterwards, ES relays (U, eo, T )  to CS in M2. 
Figure 5. An authentication and key exchange protocol using password 
In a similar way, CS checks the freshness of T and the account of U in his 
secret database. If both are correct, CS decrypts eo to get (eo', b', T) = Dcs(eo). 
CS then checks whether T = T: if not, CS rejects; otherwise, CS continues. 
CS takes out n + s and computes b = b' - (n + S) modp. Next, in M3, CS and 
ES engage in the protocol of Figure 4 to test a ?= b. If a t b, CS rejects and 
ES in turn replies reject to U. Otherwise, CS chooses z E Z, and computes 
e, = gz modp, which is in turn used to "encrypt" n + s as e2 = e,'"n + s) mod 
p. CS then sends in M4 the message of (e,,', ez, e2) to ES. Upon receiving the 
message, ES checks whether e,' = e, (e, is being kept alive in the buffer) to 
ensure that ex received in MI has not been replaced by outside attackers. 
Interestingly, here e., and e.,' are serving an extra purpose of "freshness 
nonce". If e,y' ;t e,, ES notifies CS and sends reject to U. Otherwise, ES picks 
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y~ Zy and computes e, = g" mod p. e, is then used to "encrypt" s as el = 
e,Y.s modp. Afterwards, ES sends (e,y, e,, el ,  eZ, e2) in M5 to U. Here, e,y acts 
as a freshness nonce. ES also computes a common session key K as K = 
H((e,y, U, ES). Upon receiving the message, U does the following 
calculations: computes e,y, = (e,)" mod p and obtains nl  = ellev mod p; 
computes e,yz = (eJX mod p and gets n2 = e2/en mod p;  tests n ?= n2 - nl mod 
p: if the equality holds, U is assured of the authenticity of ES and computes 
the common session K as K = H(e,,, U, ES). 
4.4.3 Security analysis 
Our architecture is different from either the standard client-server model 
(e.g., [7, 101) or the multiple-server model (e.g., [14, 15]), so formal 
provable security may be quite involved. We thus give an informal security 
analysis for the moment, yet we believe our analysis still suffices to 
guarantee the security of the protocol. Recall that the primary goal of this 
protocol is to resist off-line dictionary attacks by the two servers, where ES 
is a malicious adversary and CS is an honest-but-curious adversary under the 
adversary model that represents different levels of trust upon ES and CS. It is 
easy to see that outside attackers are no more powerful than ES in terms of 
the capability to uncover Us password. Admittedly, outside attackers can act 
as man-in-the-middle between U and ES, resulting in a legitimate user being 
deemed illegitimate by the servers. Note that such attacks are inevitable in 
any protocol, and discussion of them is beyond the scope of this work as 
they are not relevant to the password attacks. 
Resistance to CS: 
In the protocol, what relevant to CS for off-line dictionary attack is (n + r 
mod p ,  n. + s mod p), as well as the interactive protocol for testing a ?= b. 
Clearly, from n. + r mod p and n + s mod p ,  CS is unable to learn anything 
on n.; as discussed earlier, the protocol for testing a ?= b leaks nothing more 
on n. Consequently, as a passive semi-trusted adversary, CS cannot launch 
effective off-line dictionary attacks. 
Resistance to ES: 
Intuitively, if following the protocol, of help to ES regarding off-line 
dictionary attack are (r, eo) and (s, e2). However, Ecs(.) is a semantic secure 
encryption, so the first pair does not help in dictionary attack; notice then 
that (e,, e2) is a standard ElGamal encryption. As widely known, it is also 
semantic secure when g~ QR, and (n + s mod p) E QR, as in our protocol. 
Therefore, ES is not effective in off-line dictionary attack as long as he 
follows the protocol (behaving as a passive adversary). 
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As an active adversary, ES can modify or forge protocol transcript. To 
see this, ES may pick x of its choice and computes e,, and in turn makes a 
dubious eo, in an attempt to deceive CS into replying with e2 under his e,. 
This cheating however cannot succeed, due to the fact that without knowing 
x, ES is not able to convince CS of a = b. We do notice that in such a way, 
ES can launch on-line dictionary attack by repeatedly guessing passwords, 
and engaging in the protocol for testing a ?= b: each time CS returns 
(reject), ES is assured to exclude a password from the dictionary. However, 
it is clear that such attacks are unavoidable in any password-enabled system, 
but can be readily thwarted by limiting the number of unsuccessful 
authentication attempts (regarding a same user) made by ES. 
Security to outside adversaries: 
While no more effective than ES in terms of dictionary attack, an outside 
adversary could attempt to acquire the common key K established between U 
and ES. This is another common attack to authentication and key exchange 
protocols. In our protocol, as the adversary does not know x, he has no way 
to negotiate a dubious common session key with ES in the name of U. What 
remains to consider is the scenario that the adversary derives the session key 
K by watching the protocol transcript between U and ES. This in our case is 
clearly equivalent to breaking the Diffie-Hellman assumption: by given ,6' 
modp and gv modp, to compute gr" mod y without knowing x and y. 
4.4.4 Extension 
We introduce briefly how to adapt the protocol to the extended 
architecture in Figure 3 that includes a group of central servers. The 
extension turns out to be straightforward. The central servers work under a t- 
out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme [la], each keeping a share of n + s 
that would be otherwise preserved by a single central server. At the time an 
external server requests for user authentication, one of the servers volunteers 
to be the dealer, managing the reconstruction of n + s. The voluntary dealer 
is the only one interacting with the requesting external server. While the 
dealer could become a single point of vulnerability, compromise of it 
actually affects solely those x + s that had ever been reconstructed on it. 
Furthermore, as already discussed, the chance of compromising a central 
server is practically minor. After all, this extension at the central server side 
is actually aimed at solving possible bottleneck problems and break-downs 
due to a single central server. 
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4.5 Discussions 
The proposed protocol enjoys several advantages. Among others, first, 
the protocol is particularly efficient to the users in terms of both 
communication and computation. As to computation, a user only needs to 
compute 2 one-line exponentiations, and 1 off-line exponentiation and 1 off- 
line public key encryption. This is important when consider to support 
resource-constrained users, e.g., mobile phones. The communication to the 
users is optimal: only one round of interaction is involved. Second, a user 
can use the same password to register to different enterprises or to different 
affiliating organizations in a same enterprise (by varying s). This avoids a 
big inconvenience in traditional password-enabled systems (e.g., those 
reviewed in Section 2), where a user has to memorize different passwords 
for different applications. 
We next clarify a possible argument why we do not simply rely on the 
central server(s) for full trust management of the affiliating organizations, a 
paradigm similar to Kerberos ['I]. The reasons are as follows: first, each 
affiliating organization has its own business interest, so it has a stake to 
involve into the trust management of its own; second and more important, a 
main objective of our architecture is to avoid a single point of vulnerability. 
Finally, while the assumption of CS being an honest-but-curious 
adversary well represents the different levels of trust upon an enterprise and 
its affiliating organization, it is a strong one. Design of an authentication and 
key exchange protocol in the case of CS being also a malicious adversary 
(e.g., allowed to wiretap the communication between U and ES) is an open 
problem. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We explored applying authentication and key exchange using password 
to federated enterprises. Taking advantage of the special structure of a 
federated enterprise, a new architecture comprising an external server and a 
central server was proposed. A user authentication and key exchange 
protocol using password that is geared to the architecture was presented. 
Attention was focused on resisting off-line dictionary attacks by the servers, 
a topic rarely considered in previous effort. Our proposed architecture and 
protocol enjoyed several attractive features. 
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